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When legal scholars and advocates think about the intersection of law 
and social science, particularly in the areas of equal protection and civil 
rights, many think of Brown v. Board of Education.1 Brown is often 
considered the most prominent and influential use of social science evidence 
in a legal decision. The Supreme Court directly cited multiple social science 
research articles in the now (in)famous2 footnote,3 briefly validating 
researchers and the social science evidence they presented as relevant to 
judicial decision-making and general jurisprudence. But any hope generated 
by Brown’s recognition of this evidence was subsequently dashed.4 The 
debate about the relevance of social science evidence in the courtroom has 
waged on in cases involving both constitutional and statutory law, often 
fought out in highly contentious cases where the social science findings 
demonstrating gender bias in the workplace or racial bias in the criminal 
justice system run into hurdles when applied to specific plaintiffs or 
defendants in particular cases—a tension both exemplified and exacerbated 
by the Supreme Court’s handling of the social science evidence of racial bias 
 
 1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2 See, e.g., Michael Heise, Judicial Decision-Making, Social Science Evidence, and Equal 
Educational Opportunity: Uneasy Relations and Uncertain Futures, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 864, 
867–69 (2008). 
 3 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. 
 4 It was arguably immediately dashed given, in particular, the backlash and critical takedown of the 
Clark study cited to in footnote 11. Kenneth Clark responded to the backlash, defending the general use 
of social science in law by comparing it to the use of social science in other arenas, such as government 
and industry, where there would be little backlash to its use. See Kenneth B. Clark, The Desegregation 
Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist’s Role, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224, 224–25 (1959). 
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in the application of the death penalty at the center of McCleskey v. Kemp.5 
In recognition of the thirtieth anniversary of the McCleskey decision, the 
Northwestern University Law Review and an esteemed group of scholars, 
attorneys, and judges gathered to discuss the legacy of the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of social science in that case in order to examine the future of law’s 
relationship with social science evidence. This Symposium Issue collects 
their words and contemplates this legacy. 
This Symposium was spearheaded by a collective of scholars working 
at the intersection of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and empirical studies in 
the social sciences, known as the empirical Critical Race Theory (eCRT) 
working group.6 They first came together in 2010 after recognizing an 
opportunity to build a new generation of scholarship at the intersection of 
race and the law that combines traditional critical race perspectives and 
social science methods. CRT has offered remarkable insights into the way 
that law and society construct race and racial ideologies as well as the 
oppressive power of the seemingly objective language of law. CRT has 
offered doctrinal critiques, first-person narratives, and other theoretical 
deconstructions that expose the law as a racialized tool of power.7 Yet, even 
CRT has struggled to blend a critical legal perspective with social science 
methodologies and concepts. The eCRT working group comprises race and 
identity scholars—some traditional CRT legal scholars, some social 
scientists, some who are both—who take an approach to studying race and 
the law that embraces the theoretical insights of CRT and the measurement 
tools offered by social science methods. By bringing these fields together, 
eCRT tries to leverage the descriptive power of the social sciences and the 
theoretical and normative clarity of CRT to offer a new vision for race 
scholarship and legal practice.   
Much work remains to be done to reconcile the relationship between 
social science and law, as evinced on the small scale through tensions 
highlighted in the creation of eCRT and on the large scale through 
developments in equal protection and statutory doctrines over the last several 
decades. That continued negotiation is occurring in the shadow of 
McCleskey, as well as in Title VII cases like Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,8 
decided around the same time as McCleskey, and more recent cases like Wal-
 
 5 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 6 For more on the history of eCRT relative to CRT, see Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race 
Theory and Empirical Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 183 (2013). 
7 See, e.g. Kimberlé Crenshaw et al., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS 
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xii (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, 
BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND (2014). 
 8 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.9 While notions of disparate impact are cognizable 
under Title VII (unlike equal protection claims) and courts are open to the 
use of social science evidence for support, these employment law cases, and 
many more lesser-known decisions, reveal the struggle to apply empirical 
evidence in the courtroom and raise questions about the relevance of all 
social science data. McCleskey is largely known as a critical death penalty 
case that drew attention to the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. But it 
was the Court’s treatment of the social science evidence about racial 
disparities in the death penalty sentencing that has arguably had the farthest 
reaching consequences, both for death penalty litigation and reform and for 
other cases involving claims of unconstitutional bias. McCleskey had 
profound implications for how courts understand the role of social science 
for demonstrating racial discrimination that violates equal protection.  
In McCleskey, David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth 
presented compelling statistical evidence (the Baldus study)10 to support 
Warren McCleskey’s claims that Georgia’s capital sentencing regime 
violated equal protection due to racial bias. The Baldus study offered the 
Supreme Court evidence that race and racism play a significant role in 
determining who receives the death penalty in Georgia. In social science and 
reform circles, this study laid the groundwork for increased awareness of 
racial disparities in the death penalty, as well as reform efforts such as 
Kentucky and North Carolina’s Racial Justice Acts,11 laws meant to allow 
consideration of the type of evidence presented in the Baldus study to inform 
claims of racial bias in capital sentencing. 
How then did the McCleskey Supreme Court weigh the social science 
evidence in their decision? Despite their acknowledgement of the study’s 
sophisticated methodology,12 they concluded that social science evidence 
such as the Baldus study was largely irrelevant to the question of equal 
protection because it did not demonstrate intentional discrimination against 
the particular plaintiff in front of them: Warren McCleskey.13 They added 
that plaintiffs in equal protection cases must identify a discriminatory 
purpose such that the defendant acted “because of, not merely in spite of” 
some form of racial animosity,14 a doubling down on the intent requirement 
 
 9 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 10 David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death 
Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). 
 11 For a discussion of both Racial Justice Acts, see Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, 
Confronting Race: How a Confluence of Social Movements Convinced North Carolina to Go Where the 
McCleskey Court Wouldn’t, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463 (2011). 
 12 481 U.S. 279, 286, 327, 337, 341.  
 13 Id. at 292–93. 
 14 Id. at 298 (quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
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for proving discrimination established in Washington v. Davis.15 This had the 
effect of reifying a narrow conception of discrimination that focused 
primarily on intentional bad actors with specific discriminatory intent that 
caused the discrimination in question. But it also rendered social science 
evidence of systemic and widespread racial disparities virtually meaningless 
in equal protection cases, particularly in cases where the court is faced with 
an individual plaintiff or defendant but the social science can only provide 
evidence of wider spread phenomena or effects in the aggregate. 
In Title VII cases like Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,16 decided only two 
years after McCleskey, the Court was clearly influenced by the expert 
testimony on gender stereotypes. The Supreme Court decided the case for 
the plaintiff and accepted a new legal theory of sex discrimination that 
explicitly incorporated gender stereotypes as a basis for legally cognizable 
sex discrimination. But even in that case, where the Court appeared more 
open to social science evidence than when equal protection claims were 
presented, the Court dismissed the social science evidence they clearly 
engaged with as simply “icing on [the] cake.”17 Thus, McCleskey showed a 
Court that was reluctant to engage the social science evidence because, in 
part, the Justices could not understand how it translated to the constitutional 
question before them. And even when social science evidence may apply to 
cases raising statutory issues, courts are often unsure of what weight or 
credit, if any, to assign it. Instead, they often view the social science as, at 
best, confirming the courts’ intuitions about the world, making it 
commonsense “icing on the cake” rather than fundamentally helpful to the 
factfinders.18 
If we jump to the 2011 Title VII decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes,19 where the Supreme Court denied class certification of 1.5 million 
women employed at Walmart, we see persistence in courts’ reluctance to use 
social science evidence to frame and understand the social contexts of 
discrimination cases. Laurens Walker and John Monahan named this 
particular use of social science evidence “social framework” testimony.20 
The social science expert in Dukes described his expertise as social 
 
 15 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a comprehensive assessment of the intent doctrine’s evolution, see Ian 
Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).  
 16 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 17 Id. at 256. 
 18 Id. (dismissing Susan Fiske, the social science expert, as not offering anything that requires 
“special training to discern”). 
 19 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 20 Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 
73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). 
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framework analysis,21 and he offered his opinion, based largely on the social 
science theories of stereotyping and bias, that Walmart had a company 
culture that was vulnerable to gender bias and discrimination. The Supreme 
Court rejected his testimony completely, concluding that because he could 
not answer the ultimate question of how often stereotypes or bias might have 
played a role in producing the alleged discrimination at the center of the case, 
the Court could “safely disregard” his opinion.22 Because social framework 
testimony provides context for factfinders to understand broad phenomena 
such as implicit bias or stereotyping, rather than answer questions of 
causation or other inquiries specific to the particular cases at hand, courts 
continue to argue that they cannot generalize from the aggregate effects 
demonstrated by social science evidence to even a large class of plaintiffs, 
as in Dukes. 
This core tension across constitutional and statutory spaces—between 
evidence of aggregate effects and general phenomena that social science 
offers and the particular application of evidence to individual cases—is 
hashed out at every level of the courts, but likely most often at the district 
court level. There, we see similar outcomes as the Supreme Court cases 
discussed above. For example, in a Title VII race discrimination case decided 
this year in the Northern District of Illinois, the home district of the 
Northwestern University Law Review, a judge who resisted dismissing social 
science evidence on implicit bias and stereotyping outright praised the 
evidence as “fascinating” and “powerful” yet ultimately found the social 
science nondeterminative for answering the question of whether 
discrimination occurred.23 Mirroring, in many ways, the response of the 
McCleskey Court, lower courts often deem even persuasive social science 
evidence simply not relevant to the case at hand.  
The fact that courts, legal advocates, and social scientists continue to 
struggle over the tension between what courts believe social science can do 
and what they would like social science to offer means that the door is not 
completely closed to building a stronger relationship between law and social 
science. On the other hand, the door is barely open. Legal advocates, 
amenable judges, and social scientists alike will have to continue fighting to 
convince courts that social science research is a powerful tool to ensure equal 
protection and civil rights while providing valuable information to 
factfinders about the social phenomena that produce the discrimination and 
disparities at the center of these cases. 
 
 21 564 U.S. at 354. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Martin v. F.E. Moran, Inc. Fire Prot. of N. Ill., No. 13 C 3526, 2018 WL 1565597 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
30, 2018). 
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This Symposium Issue proceeds in multiple parts. First, Reva Siegel’s 
opening remarks lay the historical foundation for understanding how 
McCleskey and its doctrinal progeny miss the mark on discriminatory 
purpose.24 By locating McCleskey in the context of cases coming out of the 
Burger and Rehnquist Supreme Courts that restricted proof of discriminatory 
purpose to invidious discriminatory intent, we begin to understand the 
treatment of statistical evidence that speaks more to patterns of disparity 
rather than causal intent. 
The first set of papers address questions of McCleskey’s legacy and 
paths to overcoming the resistance to using social science evidence in a 
variety of legal contexts. Mario Barnes and Erwin Chemerinsky discuss the 
relationship between McCleskey and other major equal protection cases, 
demonstrating that the Court has treated social science evidence in uneven 
ways.25 They argue that the standards for evidence to show discrimination, 
paired with inconsistencies in the courts’ treatments of social science 
evidence, require a new approach for evaluating and applying social science 
data on racial impacts in the courts. Aya Gruber argues that Justice Lewis 
Powell’s “fear of too much justice”26 in McCleskey was driven more by his 
fear of leniency than by an aversion to addressing racial disparities.27 Ifeoma 
Ajunwa and Angela Onwuachi-Willig discuss how the use of racial impact 
statements that mandate the consideration of statistical evidence of racial 
impacts when enacting legislation could lead to reduced labor discrimination 
against the formerly incarcerated, demonstrating the power of considering 
the very types of evidence that McCleskey rejected.28 Michele Goodwin 
draws attention to how gender discrimination informs lawmaking and 
judicial decision-making in cases and legislation involving women’s 
reproductive rights in the United States and abroad.29 Like Gruber, Goodwin 
looks behind the curtain to highlight the ways that legal decisions are often 
about more than meets the eye. Jonathan Feingold and Evelyn Carter argue 
that the Supreme Court has not been as reluctant to use social science 
 
 24 Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of 
Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—And Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 
1269 (2018). 
 25 Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Brown Do for You? Addressing McCleskey v. 
Kemp as a Flawed Standard for Measuring the Constitutionally Significant Risk of Race Bias, 112 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1293 (2018). 
26 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 27 Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1337 (2018). 
 28 Ifeoma Ajunwa & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Combating Discrimination Against the Formerly 
Incarcerated in the Labor Market, 112 ˜NW. U. L. REV. 1385 (2018). 
 29 Michele Goodwin, Challenging the Rhetorical Gag and TRAP: Reproductive Capacities, Rights, 
and the Helms Amendment, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1417 (2018). 
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evidence as some have argued, but that motivated reasoning causes them to 
rely on it in some cases but not others.30 
Next, Paul Butler offers his remarks on the legacy of McCleskey and 
the impossible standards set for demonstrating racial discrimination.31 He 
worries that the project of bringing social science to bear on questions of 
equal protection and racial discrimination is doomed to fail if the takeaway 
from discussions of McCleskey is that social science just needs to provide 
more or better evidence of racial bias and discrimination in order to be 
persuasive. Instead, he argues, a willingness to confront white supremacy is 
needed. 
The second set of papers give examples of social science research that 
has been conducted to address questions of racial justice, including evidence 
of the racially disparate impacts of doctrinal and policy changes. Osagie 
Obasogie and Zachary Newman study how a doctrinal change by the 
Supreme Court in cases involving claims of excessive police force 
fundamentally changed the legal rhetoric around these claims in a way that 
undermined the use of social science evidence of group-based and structural 
racial disparities.32 Bernadette Atuahene studies how property tax policy in 
Michigan disproportionately affected black homeowners, raising questions 
about the legality of the policies under the Fair Housing Act.33 Russell 
Robinson and David Frost return us to judicial “fear[s] of too much justice,”34 
showing how the same fears motivating restraint in the application of social 
science evidence by the courts on matters of race have similarly led to 
restraint and narrow decisions in cases involving sexual orientation.35 
Kyneshawau Hurd and Victoria Plaut discuss how legal actors have used 
social science selectively to craft arguments about affirmative action that 
emphasize the benefits for majority groups rather than relying on the 
evidence of the impacts of discrimination and costs of lack of diversity for 
historically excluded groups.36 They then present a study that shows the 
 
30 Jonathan P. Feingold & Evelyn R. Carter, Eyes Wide Open: What Social Science Can Tell Us 
About the Supreme Court’s Use of Social Science, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1689 (2018).  
 31 Paul Butler, Equal Protection and White Supremacy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1457 (2018). 
 32 Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police 
Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 
1465 (2018). 
 33 Bernadette Atuahene, “Our Taxes Are Too Damn High”: Institutional Racism, Property Tax 
Assessments, and the Fair Housing Act, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1501 (2018). 
34 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 35 Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, “Playing It Safe” with Empirical Evidence: Selective Use 
of Social Science in Supreme Court Cases About Racial Justice and Marriage Equality, 112 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1565 (2018). 
 36 Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Entitlement: Does Diversity-Benefits Ideology 
Undermine Inclusion?, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1605 (2018). 
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consequences of this strategic policy framing, namely that majority groups 
prefer policies that center the benefits of policies on them rather than 
marginalized groups. 
Finally, we close this Symposium Issue with the keynote address by 
Jack Boger, who argued McCleskey before the Supreme Court.37 In his 
remarks, he reflects on the momentum toward judicial acknowledgement of 
racial disparities in capital sentencing that built during the 1960s. He 
discusses how signals from the Warren Court encouraged the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund to gather empirical evidence of racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing and to develop constitutional responses 
to those racial disparities. Unfortunately, a shift in makeup of the Supreme 
Court in 1969 and the aftermath of Furman v. Georgia38 in 1972, where the 
Court expressed concerns about the capricious and arbitrary application of 
the death penalty, soon dashed hopes of an easy path to addressing racial 
disparities in death sentences through the use of social science evidence in 
the courtroom. The Court came to believe that states’ revisions to their 
capital punishment statutes sufficiently addressed the concerns expressed in 
Furman. Even though Warren McCleskey offered the Court compelling 
evidence to the contrary, the Court ultimately decided against him. Boger 
leaves us with a call to action, encouraging social scientists and legal 
scholars to continue their pursuit of evidence of patterns of racial 
discrimination that remain widespread in the criminal justice system and 
beyond. We echo this call. 
 
 37 John Charles Boger, McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes from 1977–1991, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1637 
(2018). 
 38 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
